Ocean and Coastal Law Journal
Volume 2 | Number 2

Article 12

1996

Ballard Shipping Co. v. Beach Shellfish: The End Of
The Era When Rohins Dry Dock Foreclosed State
Jurisdiction Over The Recovery Of Economic
Damages From Oil Spills
Martin C. Womer
University of Maine School of Law

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.mainelaw.maine.edu/oclj
Recommended Citation
Martin C. Womer, Ballard Shipping Co. v. Beach Shellfish: The End Of The Era When Rohins Dry Dock Foreclosed State Jurisdiction Over
The Recovery Of Economic Damages From Oil Spills, 2 Ocean & Coastal L.J. (1996).
Available at: http://digitalcommons.mainelaw.maine.edu/oclj/vol2/iss2/12

This Case Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at University of Maine School of Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted
for inclusion in Ocean and Coastal Law Journal by an authorized administrator of University of Maine School of Law Digital Commons. For more
information, please contact mdecrow@maine.edu.

BALLARD SHIPPING CO. v. BEACH SHELLFISH:
THE END OF THE ERA WHEN ROBINS DRYDOCK
FORECLOSED STATE JURISDICTION OVER
THE RECOVERY OF ECONOMIC
DAMAGES FROM OIL SPILLS
Martin C. Womer*
I. INTRODUCTION

In its 1994 decision, Ballard Shipping Co. v. Beach Shellfish, the
United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit allowed private parties
to sue under state law for purely economic losses resulting from a marine
oil spill. The court held that the Rhode Island Environmental Injury
Compensation Act (the Compensation Act),2 which permits such plaintiffs
to sue, is not preempted by federal admiralty law, which would have
barred suit. The long-standing rule in admiralty, encapsulated in the case
Robins Dry Dock & Repair Co. v. Flint, is that purely economic losses
are not compensable in the absence of damage to property or person.
The BallardShipping Co. v. Beach Shellfish litigation resulted from
a major spill of heating oil from the tanker M/V World Prodigy into Rhode
Island's Narragansett Bay in June 1989. The First Circuit's decision is
noteworthy in two regards. First, in it the court applied a refinement in
admiralty preemption analysis that had been laid down in 1994 by the
United States Supreme Court in American Dredging Co. v. Miller.4
BallardShipping's early application of the American Dredging preemption
analysis gives the case visibility. Second, Ballard Shipping's greater
significance is in the First Circuit's substantive holding that the Robins
*
1.
2.
3.
4.

University of Maine School of Law, Class of 1997.
32 F.3d 623 (1st Cir. 1994).
R.I. Gen. Laws §§ 46-12.3-1 to -12.3-8 (1991).
275 U.S. 303 (1927).
510 U.S. 443 (1994).

435

436

OCEAN AND COASTAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 2:435

Dry Dock rule is not a "characteristic feature" of maritime law the
"material prejudice" of which would trigger preemption. The First
Circuit's holding signals the end of Robins Dry Dock as a bar to claims
under state law for purely economic damages caused by a marine oil spill.
Prior to BallardShipping, the Robins rule served as a nearly complete
shield from liability for marine oil spills, until the effective date of the Oil
Pollution Act of 1990.1 Before this time, state common law and statutory
attempts to allow recovery to injured parties were generally preempted.
This Note discusses the role of the Ballard Shipping decision in
signaling the end of the Robins Dry Dock era, when the recovery of
purely economic losses from oil pollution was foreclosed.
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND

A. Admiralty Jurisdiction
The Constitution grants the federal courts authority over "all Cases
of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction."6 Oil spills that occur on navigable waters and arise out of traditional maritime activity are subject to
federal admiralty jurisdiction,7 and federal maritime law, which is largely
uncodified. 8 The federal courts were vested with "exclusive original
cognizance of all civil causes of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction" by
the Judiciary Act of 1789. 9 The act, however, contained a provision
"saving to suitors, in all cases, the right of a common law remedy, where
the common law is competent to give it."10 The modem version of this
statute saves for suitors "all other remedies to which they are otherwise
entitled." 1 ' This means that the fact that a plaintiff's claim comes under
admiralty jurisdiction doesn't necessarily foreclose remedies under state
law as well. Such state claims may be brought in state court or, where
there is a basis for federal jurisdiction, in federal court.' 2 In either forum,

5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.

33 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2761 (1994).
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
Executive Jet Aviation, Inc. v. City of Cleveland, 409 U.S. 249, 253-61 (1972).
East River S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, 476 U.S. 858, 864 (1985).
1 Stat. 76-77 (1789).
Id.

11. 28 U.S.C. § 1333(1) (1994).
12. Ballard Shipping Co. v. Beach Shellfish, 32 F.3d at 623, 626 (1st Cir. 1994).
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the state law13 applied needs to "conform to governing federal maritime
standards."
B. Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, and
American Dredging Co. v. Miller
Two Supreme Court decisions, Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen14 in
1917, and American Dredging Co. v. Milleri" in 1994, provide the legal
framework to determine whether a state law conflicts with governing
federal maritime standards sufficiently to justify preemption. In Jensen,
the Court held that state law affecting maritime commerce is unconstitutional if it fails any of three prongs: first, if it "contravenes the essential
purpose expressed by an act of Congress;" second, if it "works material
prejudice to the characteristic features of the general maritime law;" or
third, if it "interferes with the proper harmony and uniformity of that law
in its international and interstate relations. "16
In 1994, the three-prong test of Jensen was confirmed in American
Dredging.'7 The Supreme Court narrowly construed Jensen's second
prong by interpreting the term "characteristic feature" to apply only to a
federal rule that either "originated in admiralty" or "has exclusive
application there."18 This is a critical narrowing because it means that if
a federal rule did not originate nor find exclusive application in admiralty,
concurrent state law does not need to be consistent to satisfy the second
prong of the Jensen test. 9

13. Offshore Logistics, Inc. v. Tallentire, 477 U.S. 207, 223 (1986) (citations
omitted). "[Tihe extent to which state law may be used to remedy maritime injuries is
constrained by a so-called 'reverse-Erie' doctrine which requires that the substantive
remedies afforded by the states conform to governing federal maritime standards." Id.
14. Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205 (1917).
15. American Dredging Co. v. Miller, 510 U.S. 443 (1994).
16. Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. at 216.
17. American Dredging Co. v. Miller, 510 U.S. at 447 n.1 (decided after the
District Court's dismissal of the Ballard Shipping case, but before the First Circuit
appellate decision).
18. Id. at 450.
19. The combined American Dredging-Jensenpreemption test has been applied in
several reported cases: Calhoun v. Yamaha Motor Corp., U.S.A., 40 F.3d 622, 627-629,
637 (3d Cir. 1994) (Pennsylvania wrongful death and survival statutes were not preempted
by the Jones Act nor by the general maritime law under the American Dredging-Jensen
test), aff'd, 116 S.Ct. 619 (1996); In re Nautilus Motor Tanker Co., 900 F. Supp. 697,
702-03 (D.N.J. 1995) (New Jersey common law private right of action for purely economic
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C. Rhode Island EnvironmentalInjury CompensationAct

The Compensation Act became effective on September 30, 1990, but
is applicable retroactively to any cause of action pending in court on that
date or later, regardless of when the violation or negligent act occurred,
so long as suit was commenced within the applicable statute of

limitations.' ° The Compensation Act provides that a person is entitled to
recover for economic losses if he or she can show financial losses arising
from damage to natural resources of the state of Rhode Island; where such
damages are caused by a violation of any provision of the state's piloting

or water pollution laws, or caused by negligence of the owner or operator

damages from marine oil spill was not preempted by Robins Dry Dock rule of the general
maritime law under American Dredging-Jensentest, following the First Circuit's decision
in Ballard Shipping); Clancy v. Mobil Oil Corp., 906 F.Supp. 42, 47-48 (D. Mass. 1995)
(New Hampshire and New York loss of consortium statutes were preempted by the
conflicting federal Jones Act according to both the first and third prongs of the Jensen test,
but loss of consortium was not a characteristic feature of maritime law so did not fail the
second Jensen prong as defined by American Dredging);Aurora Maritime Co. v. Abdullah
Mohamed Fahem & Co., 85 F.3d 44, 45-49 (2d Cir. 1996) (New York lien statute was
preempted by Rule B of the Supplemental Rules for Certain Admiralty and Maritime
Claims under the third prong of American Dredging-Jensentest). It should be noted that
although the Calhoun, Nautilus and Clancy cases also cited Ballard Shipping for its
application and interpretation of the American Dredgingpreemption analysis, the Aurora
case did not cite BallardShipping. In Aurora, the Second Circuit explicitly followed
American Dredging in arriving at a determination of preemption in reference to competing
state law and maritime liens, without any mention of BallardShipping. Id. at 47-49.
20. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 46, ch. 12.3, COMPILER's NoTEs (1991) (citing 1990 R.I.
Pub. Laws ch. 198 § 2).
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of a seagoing vessel. 21 The injured party can recover for purely economic
losses without sustaining physical injury to person or property.?

21. R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 46-12.3-2, 12.3-3 (1991).
46-12.3-2. Strict Liability. - The owner, operator, and/or his or her or
its agent of any seagoing vessel... entering the waters or waterways of this
state who shall violate the provisions of chapter 9 or 9.1 of title 46, regarding
the obligation of a vessel to have a licensed pilot on board prior to entering a
navigable waterway of the state or chapter 12 of title 46, regarding water
pollution or any violation of any permit, rule, regulation, or order issued
pursuant thereto, shall be strictly liable for any injury or damage resulting from
the violation, including, but not limited to, damage or injury to the environment or natural resources of the state, injury to the person, property damage,
or economic loss to any individual, corporation, partnership, or other business

entity.
46-12.3-3. Action on negligence. - Any person who sustains personal
injury, property damage, or economic loss as a result of the negligent act of
any owner, operator, and/or his or her or its agent of any seagoing vessel...
entering the waters or waterways of the state, shall be entitled to maintain an
action to recover the damages pursuant to the provisions of § 46-12.3-1.
Id.
22. R.I. GEN. LAws § 46-12.3-4 (1991).
46-123-4. Recovery for economic loss. - A person shall be entitled to
recover for economic loss.., if the person can demonstrate the loss of income
or diminution of profit to a person or business as a result of damage to the
natural of the state of Rhode Island caused by the violation of any provision [or
the piloting or water pollution laws] ... by the owner or operator ... of the
seagoing vessel and/or caused by the negligence of the owner or operator..
. of the seagoing vessel.
(b) In any suit brought to recover economic loss it shall not be necessary to
prove that the loss was sustained as a result of physical injury to the person or
damage to his or her property, nor shall it be a defense to any claim that the
defendant owed no special duty to the plaintiff or that the loss was the result of
governmental action taken in response to the violation and/or negligence of the
defendant.
(c) Without limiting the generality of the foregoing, persons engaged in
commercial fishing or shellfishing and/or the processors of fish or shellfish,
who can demonstrate that they have sustained a loss of income or profit as a
result of damage to the environment resulting from [violations of law or
negligence] . . . shall have a cause of action for economic loss. Persons
employed by, or who operate businesses, who have sustained a loss of income
or profit as a result of a decrease in the volume of business caused by the
damage to the environment shall also be entitled to maintain an action for
economic loss.
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D. The Rule of Robins Dry Dock & Repair Co. v. Flint

Liability for purely economic tort damages resulting from maritime
shipping activities has for many years been limited by the doctrine of
Robins Dry Dock.23 In this 1927 case, a steamship's propeller was
negligently damaged while the vessel was being serviced at the Robins
Dry Dock & Repair Company. The damage extended the necessary time
for repairs. George Flint sued the Robins company for lost profits that he
would have earned if the ship had been available on time for him to
charter as he had contracted. In the Supreme Court's majority opinion,
Justice Holmes said:
[N]o authority need be cited to show that, as a general rule, at

least, a tort to the person or property of one man does not make
a tortfeasor liable to another merely because the injured person
was under a contract with that other, unknown to the doer of the
wrong.... The law does not spread its protection so far.4
The holding of Robins Dry Dock can be read narrowly to limit only
losses resulting from unintentional interference with contract. However,
the majority view,' and that adopted by the First Circuit,' is that Robins
Dry Dock is a bar to third parties' claims under federal maritime law for

23. Due to the prominence of this decision in general maritime law and in any
comprehensive discussion about liability for damages in tort, much has been written about
the decision and its implications. See, e.g., David R. Owen, Recovery for Economic Loss
Under U.S. MaritimeLaw: Sixty Years Under Robins Dry Dock, 18 J. MAR. L. & COM.
157 (1987); Pegeen Mulhern, Marine Pollution, Fishers, and the Pillarsof the Land: A
Tort Recovery Standardfor Pure Economic Losses, 18 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 85
(1990); Francis J. Gonynor, The Robins Dry Dock Rule: Is the "BrightLine" Fading?4
U.S.F. MAR. L.J. 85 (1992).
24. Robins Dry Dock & Repair Co. v. Flint, 275 U.S. at 309.
25. Louisiana ex rel. Guste v. MN Testbank, 752 F.2d 1019, 1021-1028 (5th Cir.
1985) (en banc), cert. denied, 477 U.S. 903 (1986). Circuit Court Judge Higginbotham's
opinion for the majority carefully documents both the broad acceptance of the rule of
Robins Dry Dock and the application by courts in America and England of a bar on
recovery for purely economic damages from both maritime and nonmaritime torts for half
a century before the Robins decision. Id. at 1021-23. This historical account was
significant for the BallardShipping court because it clearly documents that the Robins Dry
Dock rule did not originate in admiralty nor was it exclusive to admiralty.
26. Barbour Lines A/S v. MiV Donau Maru, 764 F.2d 50, 51-52 (lst Cir. 1985).
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any purely economic losses arising from an unintentional maritime tort in

the absence of physical injury, with few exceptions.2'
E. Oil PollutionAct of 1990

The Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA)? was Congress' response to a
series of major oil tanker spills that polluted American waters and
shorelines in the 1980s. 29 Prior to this enactment, the United States

Congress had refused to sign onto several international oil pollution
protocols, primarily because they would have barred oil spill liability

under state law.30

27. See Union Oil Co. v. Oppen, 501 F.2d 558 (9th Cir. 1974) (allowing claims by
fishermen); Dick Meyers Towing Serv., Inc. v. United States, 577 F.2d 1023, 1025 (5th
Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 908 (1979) (allowing claims for economic losses that
are intentionally caused).
28. 33 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2761 (1994).
29. These spills included the World Prodigy spill, the Erxon Valdez oil spill in Prince
William Sound, Alaska, and oil spills in the Delaware River and the Houston Ship
Channel. See Stephen R. Eubank, PatchworkJustice: State Unlimited Liability Laws in
the Wake of the Oil PollutionAct of 1990, 18 MD. J. INT'L L. & TRADE 149, 150 n.7
(1994). See also George I. Mitchell, Preservationof State and FederalAuthority Under
the Oil PollutionAct of 1990, 21 ENVTL. L. 237 (1991):
During the past two years, America's waters and shores were fouled
repeatedly by oil spewed from the torn hulls of leaking tankers. Globs of oil
from wrecked ships victimized the Texas coast and were commonplace in New
York harbor. A similar fate struck the California shoreline, the Delaware
River, Rhode Island's Narragansett Bay and, of course, Alaska's Prince
William Sound. Virtually every major waterbody in our nation has been
scarred by spilled oil.
Id. at 237-238.
30. Mitchell, supra note 29, at 237.
This comprehensive oil spill legislation had been stymied for years because of
a dispute over whether such a law should preempt state laws regarding oil
spills, and in particular whether the United States should adopt international oil
spill liability agreements which would preempt both state and federal oil spill
liability schemes. Ultimately, in the OPA, Congress rejected preemption of
state law by federal law and preemption of state and federal law by the
international agreements. .

.

.

Most importantly, the OPA specifically

preserves the authority of the states to retain or establish more stringent
liability schemes than the OPA itself provides.
Before passage of the OPA, efforts to enact a tough new oil pollution law
had been stymied for more than ten years, principally by a fundamental
disagreement concerning the wisdom of preempting state authority to impose
additional liability requirements on the oil shipping industry.
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OPA affects many aspects of oil spill liability, but in the context of the
BallardShipping decision, two aspects are of particular importance. For
oil spills that take place on or after the Act's effective date, August 18,
1990,31 OPA allows compensation for purely economic losses.3 2 It also
specifically allows concurrent jurisdiction for states by providing that
neither OPA nor the Shipowner's Limitation of Liability Act of 185 13
preempts state imposition of additional liability, or requirements, with
respect to "the discharge of oil or other pollution by oil within the state. ,3
III. BALLARD SHIPPING CO. V. BEACH SHELLFISH
A. Facts
The dispute in BallardShipping resulted from the June 23, 1989, spill
of over 300,000 gallons of heating oil into Narragansett Bay, Rhode
Island, from the oil tanker M/V World Prodigy. The tanker, owned by

Id. at 237-239.
31. 33 U.S.C. § 2717(e) (1994).
32. "Damages equal to the loss of profits or impairment of earning capacity due to
the injury, destruction, or loss of real property, personal property, or natural resources,
which shall be recoverable by any claimant." 33 U.S.C. § 2702(b)(2)(E) (1994).
33. 46 U.S.C. app. §§ 181-195 (1988).
34. (a) Preservation of State authorities; Solid Waste Disposal Act
Nothing in this chapter or the Act of March 3, 1851, shall (1) affect, or be construed or interpreted as preempting, the authority
of any State or political subdivision thereof from imposing any
additional liability or requirements with respect to (A) the discharge of oil or other pollution by oil within such State;
or
(B) any removal activities in connection with such a discharge; or
(2) affect, or be construed or interpreted to affect or modify in any
way the obligations or liabilities of any person under the Solid Waste
Disposal Act (42 U.S.C. 6901 et seq.) or State law, including common
law ....
(c) Additional requirements and liabilities; penalties
Nothing in this chapter, the Act of March 3, 1851, (46 U.S.C. 183 et seq.), or
section 9509 of Title 26, shall in any way affect, or be construed to affect, the
authority of the United States or any State or political subdivision thereof (1) to impose additional liability or additional requirements; or
(2) to impose, or to determine the amount of, any fine or penalty
(whether criminal or civil in nature) for any violation of law;
relating to the discharge, or substantial threat or a discharge, of oil.
33 U.S.C. § 2718 (1994).
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Ballard Shipping Co., ran aground when it strayed from the designated
shipping channel and collided with a rock about one mile south of
Newport at the mouth of the bay. Due to the oil contamination, the State
of Rhode Island closed Narragansett Bay to all fishing activities for two
weeks during and after the oil spill clean-up operations.3 s
Almost 450 parties filed suit against Ballard Shipping claiming
injuries from the oil spill.3" In December, 1989 the company filed a
motion in admiralty37 for either the limitation of, or exoneration from,
liability. 38 The company also moved for dismissal of twenty-nine suits
filed by various plaintiffs.39 These plaintiffs included: seafood dealers,

tackle shop operators, restaurant owners and employees, a scuba equipment and canoe rental shop, and a variety of other shoreline businesses
operating in the Narragansett Bay area. The parties claims were for
purely economic injuries resulting from loss of business caused by the

spill. At trial, Ballard did not deny that these parties may have suffered
financial harm as a result of the oil spill, but argued that they were barred
from legal remedies for these purely economic claims. 40 The District
Court for the District of Rhode Island determined that admiralty jurisdic-

35. The captain was charged with violating state law by entering the bay without a
local pilot on board as required. Both the captain and the company also were charged,
pleaded guilty, and were fined for criminal violations of the Federal Water Pollution
Control Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c) (1994). In addition to fines of $30,500 from the captain
and $500,000 from Ballard Shipping, the company agreed to pay $3.9 million in
compensation for federal clean-up cost, $4.7 million for state clean-up costs and damage
to natural resources, $500,000 of which was to be available to compensate individuals, and
$550,000 to settle claims for lost wages by local shellfishermen. Ballard Shipping Co. v.
Beach Shellfish, 32 F.3d 623, 624 (1st Cir. 1994).
36. In re Complaint of Ballard Shipping Co., 810 F. Supp. 359, 361 (D.R.I. 1993).
For the prior history of the case, see In re Complaint of Ballard Shipping Co., 772 F.
Supp. 721 (D.R.I. 1991); In re Complaint of Ballard Shipping Co., 752 F. Supp. 546
(D.R.I. 1990).
37. Admiralty court serves as the forum even for nonadmiralty motions for limitation
of maritime liability. "The court of admiralty in [a limitation of liability] proceeding
acquires the right to marshal all claims, whether of strictly admiralty origin or not, and to
give effect to them by the apportionment of the res and by judgment in personamagainst
the owner, so far as the court may decree." Just v. Chambers, 312 U.S. 383, 386 (1941).
38. In re Complaint of Ballard Shipping Co., 810 F. Supp. at 361 (citing 46 U.S.C.
app. § 183 (1988)).
39. Id.
40. Id.
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tion applied, and held that Robins Dry Dock barred suits in admiralty for
purely economic injuries and granted Ballard's motion to dismiss.4
B. Arguments on Appeal
A group of shellfish dealers appealed the district court's dismissal to
the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit. They alleged
negligence under the general maritime law and Rhode Island common
law, but emphasized their claims under the Compensation Act. The
shellfish dealers alleged severe economic losses arising from the two week
suspension of shellfishing during the busiest time of harvesting season.42
The First Circuit affirmed the district court's holding that Robins Dry
Dock foreclosed the shellfish dealers' maritime law claims because they
were "purely for economic losses, unaccompanied by any physical injury
to their property or person. "'I Based on its review of the Compensation
Act, the First Circuit determined that the statutory claims fully encompassed the shellfish dealers' common law claims.' The court, therefore,
focused its analysis on the statutory claims. The central issues facing the
First Circuit were "[h]ow far th[e] conformity requirement [(for state law
to conform to federal maritime law)] extends, and whether the maritime
law preempts the dealers' state-law claims. "45 The court analyzed these
questions by applying the three-prong American Dredging-Jensentest.
First, the court noted that no act of Congress was involved in the
appeal, so the first prong of the Jensen test-whether the state law
"contravenes the essential purpose expressed by an act of Congress"-was
irrelevant.' Next, the court took up the second prong: whether the state
law works "material prejudice" to the characteristic features of the general
maritime law.47 The First Circuit applied the American Dredging refinement of the second prong which asks whether the rule in question
"originated in admiralty" or "was exclusive application there." 48 The

41. Id. at 369.
42.
published
losses.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

Ballard Shipping Co. v. Beach Shellfish, 32 F.3d 623, 624 (1st Cir. 1994). The
opinion does not report a claimed dollar value of the shellfish dealers' economic
Id. at 625.
Id. at 626.
Id.
Id. at 627.
Id.
Id.
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court then found "no evidence that Robins' denial of recovery for purely
economic losses originated in admiralty." 49 Additionally, the First Circuit

found that the rule forbidding recovery for purely economic losses had not
been applied exclusively in admiralty, but rather had been applied in other
legal forums over the years.- ° In sum, the First Circuit held "that Rhode
Island's decision to depart from Robins does not materially prejudice a
rule that originated in or is exclusive to general maritime law."51
Finally, the Ballard Shipping court looked to the third prong of
Jensen: whether the state law "interferes with the proper harmony and
uniformity" of maritime law. The court noted that the third prong
involves a balancing of state and federal interests. After recognizing that
admiralty does not require rigid uniformity,52 the court emphasized that
the state has a "weighty" interest in protecting its navigable waters,
shores, and people from oil pollution.53 The First Circuit also emphasized
that preemption is not presumed, but rather that a court needs to "act with
caution" when dealing with the constitutionality of a matter of great
importance to a state.5' The federal interest in limiting remedies available

49. Id. "Justice Holmes's opinion in Robins presents the rule as a virtual truism for
which 'no authority need be cited,' ... and refers the reader to three other opinions in
which '[a] good statement [of the rule] will be found.'" Id. (citations omitted). Of the
three cases cited by Justice Holmes, two were maritime cases, Elliot Steam Tug Co., Ltd.
v. The Shipping Controller, 1 K.B. 127, 139, 140 (1922), and The Federal No. 2, 21 F.2d
313 (2d Cir. 1927), but one was a nonmaritime case, Byrd v. English, 43 S.E. 419 (1903).
Additionally, Justice Holmes referred to a second nonmaritime case, NationalSavings Bank
v. Ward, 100 U.S. 195 (1879). The BallardShipping court also noted that the rule against
recovery for purely economic damages is sometimes traced to the 1875 nonmaritime case
of Cattle v. Stockton Waterworks Co., 10 Q.B. 453 (1875). Ballard Shipping Co. v. Beach
Shellfish, 32 F.3d at 628.
50. Ballard Shipping Co. v. Beach Shellfish, 32 F.3d at 628.
51. Id.
52. "Our circuit has acknowledged that 'the Supreme Court... no longer construes
the Admiralty Clause as requiring 'rigid national uniformity in maritime legislation'...
and that the preemption issue 'ordinarily requires a delicate accommodation of federal and
state interests.'" Id. at 628-29 (quoting Carey v. Bahama Cruise Lines, 864 F.2d 201,207
(1st Cir. 1988)).
53. In balancing the state interest in regulation against a potential overriding federal need for harmony or uniformity, we start with Rhode Island's
interest in implementing its Compensation Act. No one can doubt that the
state's interest in avoiding pollution in its navigable waters and on its shores,
and in redressing injury to its citizens from such pollution, is a weighty one.
Id. at 629.
54. Id. at 630.
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to claimants is more subtle but not unimportant; in this case, it is the
federal interest in the "out-of-court behavior of ships and sailors."" The
greatest risk of direct conflict between federal and state requirements
comes when they both control such "primary conduct" of a regulated
party. The Compensation Act does not regulate primary conduct, but
rather is directed at results of conduct that is already unlawful, so it does
not directly interfere with federal interests."
The court reasoned that the federal interest in controlling maritime
conduct is analogous, though not identical, to the federal concern under
the Commerce Clause57 to prevent states from imposing an impermissible
burden on interstate commerce. 8 Specifically, the court explained that the
federal interest in maritime matters is to ensure that state standards do not
create barriers to maritime commerce and travel, and also that they do not
place unreasonable burdens on shippers. The court noted that the
Compensation Act incorporates the standard tort limitations of foreseeability and proximate cause recognized in admiralty; therefore a plaintiff's
burden to prove foreseeability and proximate cause will not alter the
financial and administrative burdens currently placed on shippers under
59
the maritime law.
Finally, in assessing the question of interference with the "proper
harmony and uniformity" of the maritime law, the First Circuit evaluated
Congress' intent in passing the Oil Pollution Act of 1990. Although OPA
is not retroactive and therefore did not apply directly to the 1989 Ballard
Shipping oil spill, the Act allows injured parties to recover for purely

55. Id. at 629.
56. Id.
57. "Congress shall have the power . . . To regulate Commerce with foreign
Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes .... " U.S. CONST.
art. I, § 8.
58. Ballard Shipping Co. v. Beach Shellfish, 32 F.3d at 630.
59. Id. The liability limiting effect of the plaintiffs burden to prove proximate cause
and foreseeability is well exhibited in the Ninth Circuit's decision in Benefiel v. Exxon
Corp., 959 F.2d 805 (9th Cir. 1992). In Benefiel, the plaintiffs sought to recover for the
increased prices they were forced to pay to purchase gasoline in California as a result of
the Exxon Valdez oil spill. The Ninth Circuit held that the complaint set forth a claim
under the federal Trans-Alaska Pipeline Authorization Act (TAPAA), 43 U.S.C. §§
1651-1655 (1988), but that in enacting strict liability provisions of TAPAA, Congress did
not intend to abrogate all principles of proximate cause. Even without considering the rule
of Robins Dry Dock, proximate cause could not reasonably be established under the facts
alleged by the plaintiffs, so the case was dismissed. Benefiel v. Exxon Corp., 959 F.2d
at 808.
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economic losses and allows states to legislate liability for oil spill pollution

concurrently with the federal law. Therefore, the court concluded that
OPA was substantial evidence of Congress' intent that concurrent state
jurisdiction allowing recovery for purely economic damages does not
overburden maritime commerce. 60

The First. Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of the federal
admiralty claims, reversed its dismissal of the shellfish dealers' state
claims, and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its
opinion. In short, although their general maritime law claims were barred
by the rule of Robins Dry Dock, the shellfish dealers were allowed to

proceed and to litigate their claims on the merits under state law.
IV. DISCUSSION

A. The Second Prong:

Nonpreemption Depended on American Dredging
The First Circuit's application ofAmerican Dredgingdistinguished the
nonpreemption holding in Ballard Shipping from earlier oil or chemical
spill cases. 6 ' Presumably, without this application of American Dredging,
60. Ballard Shipping Co. v. Beach Shellfish, 32 F.3d at 631.
61. Including the District Court's ruling in In re Complaint of BallardShipping, 810
F. Supp. 359 (D.R.I. 1993).
A marine oil spill case with many similarities to BallardShipping, but decided before
American Dredging, was In re Exxon Valdez, 767 F. Supp. 1509 (D. Alaska 1991) (where
various Alaskan business interests sued for the recovery of purely economic damages in
wake of Exxon Valdez oil spill). Here, the United States District Court for the District of
Alaska found that general maritime law preempted state law above a $100-million liability
limit set by the federal Trans-Alaska Pipeline Authorization Act (TAPAA), 43 U.S.C. §§
1651-1655 (1988), but that general maritime law did not govern liability below $100
million because it had been displaced by Congress' passage of TAPAA. The district court
held that to the extent that Alaska state law imposed unlimited strict liability on oil
polluters which exceeded the limit of strict liability imposed by TAPAA, the state law was
preempted by the general maritime law. Consequently, the Robins rule then barred private
recovery for purely economic losses above TAPAA's $100-million liability limit. Below
$100 million, however, the state law was not preempted because it was a "valid exercise
of the state's police power" and did not conflict with TAPAA. In re Exxon Valdez, 767
F. Supp. at 1514. Looking just at the decision concerning liability above TAPAA's
$100-million limit, the opposite outcome in 1991 in In re Exxon Valdez compared to
BallardShipping three years later was due to the intervening 1994 Supreme Court decision,
which established theAmerican Dredgingrule. See also Pruitt v. Allied Chem. Corp., 523
F. Supp. 975 (E.D. Va. 1981).
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the First Circuit would have affirmed the district court's ruling in its
entirety, on the grounds that the Compensation Act and state common law
were preempted by the general maritime law and that recovery for the
plaintiffs' losses was, therefore, barred by Robins Dry Dock.
Before the First Circuit's BallardShipping decision, the Robins Dry
Dock rule played two distinct roles in state law cases of this kind. First,
the rule was considered to be a "characteristic feature" of the general
maritime law, which would preempt any state law that caused it "material
prejudice." Second, once preemption occurred, the Robins Dry Dock
rule, as substantive law, barred recovery under the general maritime law.
The BallardShipping court distinguished these two roles; it found that
the American Dredging clarification of what it means to be a "characteristic feature" of the general maritime law under Jensen was not satisfied by
the Robins Dry Dock rule. Therefore, the conflict between Rhode Island
law and the Robins Dry Dock rule did not result in preemption. This
allowed the plaintiffs to pursue recovery under state law unhindered by
Robins Dry Dock. For those claims brought in admiralty, however, the
Robins Dry Dock rule was indisputably an effective bar to recovery.
The Ballard Shipping court's holding-that the Robins Dry Dock rule
is not a "characteristic feature" of the general maritime law-significantly
narrows the power of the Robins doctrine. This holding opens the door
for concurrent state laws to regulate other purely economic marine tort
damages where such state law would have been preempted on account of
the second prong in the past. As a result, the First Circuit's application
of the American Dredging-Jensen test represents a significant enhancement of states' power to legislate such remedies.
This is not to say that a state statute or common law granting a private
right of action for purely economic damages cannot be preempted by the
general maritime law for other reasons. All three prongs of the American
Dredging-Jensentest remain in full force as grounds for preemption and
each needs to be satisfied. 62 BallardShipping holds that the Robins Dry
Dock rule does not trigger preemption under the second prong. Other

62. See, e.g., Clancy v. Mobil Oil Corp., 906 F. Supp. 42, 47 n.4 (D. Mass. 1995)
(loss of consortium is not a characteristic feature of maritime law for purposes of the
second American Dredging-Jensenprong, but New Hampshire and New York loss of
consortium statutes are nevertheless preempted by the Jones Act under the first and third
prongs).
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"characteristic features of the general maritime law" may still trigger
preemption under the second prong.63
B. The ThirdProng:
TraditionalTort LimitationsProtect Shippers
The BallardShipping court found that the third prong of the American

Dredging-Jensenpreemption test-whether a state law "interferes with the
proper harmony and uniformity" of maritime law-was not violated by the
Compensation Act.' As the First Circuit concluded, the fact that the state
statute included the standard tort limitations of foreseeability and proximate cause minimized any harm that the state law might cause to the
harmony and uniformity of maritime law. 65 The court further explained
that these traditional tort limitations moderate the financial and administrative burdens on maritime shippers that result from state regulation of
maritime pollution.
In reaching this conclusion, the First Circuit applied a rationale that
mirrors the reasoning offered a decade ago in a dissent by Judge Wisdom
in Louisiana ex rel. Guste v. M/V Testbank.66 In a detailed opinion
opposing the application of Robins Dry Dock, Judge Wisdom advocated
the superiority of applying "a rule of recovery based on conventional tort
principles of proximate cause and foreseeability and limit[ing] eligibility

63. See Aurora Maritime Co. v. Abdullah Mohamed Fahem & Co., 85 F.3d 44 (2d
Cir. 1996) (maritime attachment is a characteristic feature of maritime law under the
American Dredging rule and triggers preemption of competing state setoff statute). It
should also be borne in mind that even in the absence of preemption, state law itself may
bar recovery for purely economic losses.
64. Ballard Shipping Co. v. Beach Shellfish, 32 F.3d at 628-631.
65. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
66. 752 F.2d 1019 (5th Cir. 1985). A huge spill of toxic chemicals in the Mississippi
River Gulf outlet in 1980 resulted in temporary suspension of all fishing, shrimping, and
related activity. Commercial fishermen, shippers, marina and boat rental operators,
wholesale and retail seafood businesses, seafood restaurants, tackle and bait shops, and
recreational fishermen sued. The Fifth Circuit held that, on the basis of Robins Dry Dock,
plaintiffs other than commercial fishermen who sustained no physical damage to property
from the spill and subsequent closure of the waterway could not recover for purely
economic maritime tort injuries, despite having brought claims under common law tort
theories and under federal and state statutes. This case is widely cited by other courts.
See, e.g., In re Cleveland Tankers, Inc., 791 F. Supp. 669, 671 (E.D. Mich. 1992).
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only by the requirement that a plaintiff prove 'particular' damages." 67
Judge Wisdom reasoned that the application of negligence concepts of
foreseeability and proximate cause, 68 assigns liability to tort-feasors in a
fair manner which is balanced by the plaintiffs' burden to prove their
case. This "alternate rule of recovery," as Judge Wisdom called it, would
offer the following advantages: compensation for damaged plaintiffs,
imposition of the cost of damages upon those who have caused the harm,
and consistency with economic principles of modem tort law. 69 Such an
application would also "free[ ] courts from the necessity of creating a
piecemeal quilt of exceptions to avoid the harsh effects of the Robins
rule. "7

C. Parametersof the First Circuit's Third Prong Analysis:
Congress Does Not ConsiderState Regulation of Oil Spills to Interfere
With ProperHarmony and Uniformity of Maritime Law
In reaching its decision under the third prong of American Dredging,

the First Circuit relied upon congressional intent that neither OPA nor the
Shipowner's Limitation of Liability Act of 1851 be able to completely
preempt state jurisdiction over oil spill liability. 7 In preserving state
authority to regulate oil pollution, Congress' action established that such
state authority does not interfere with the "proper harmony and uniformity" of the maritime law. 72

67. Louisiana ex rel. Guste v. M/V Testbank, 752 F.2d at 1035-53 (Wisdom, J.,
dissenting).
68. See In re Kinsman Transit Co. v. City of Buffalo, 388 F.2d 821 (3d Cir. 1968)
(injuries to the plaintiffs were too remote or indirect a consequence of the defendants'
negligence to have been foreseeable).
69. Louisiana ex rel. Guste v. M/V Testbank, 752 F.2d at 1051.
70. Id. In addition, the plaintiffs' burden of proving particular damages in order to
bring a private action for public nuisance confronts them with an uphill battle to recovery.
See, e.g., Burgess v. M/V Tamano, 370 F. Supp. 247, 250-251 (D. Me. 1973), aff'd
mem., 559 F.2d 1200 (1st Cir. 1977) (in private action for public nuisance caused by
marine oil spill, commercial fishermen and clam diggers were allowed to maintain suit
against alleged oil spillers because the fishermen and clam diggers suffered loss different
than the public generally, while the owners of motels, trailer parks, camp grounds,
restaurants, grocery stores, and similar establishments, whose businesses were dependent
on tourism, were denied recovery because the damages they suffered resulted indirectly
from oil pollution).
71. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
72. Ballard Shipping Co. v. Beach Shellfish, 32 F.3d 623, 631 (1st Cir. 1994).
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Those who would oppose the First Circuit's analysis under the third
prong would likely argue that the application of Robins Dry Dock is
essential to the proper harmony and uniformity of the maritime law. Such
opponents would point to benefits of improved administration of the law
and predictability of case outcomes,73 as well as avoidance of "double
counting." 74 However, the cost of those benefits is denial of recourse for
legitimate victims; the economic losses become externalities borne not by
the tort-feasors but by others in society.
In contrast, those advocating abandonment of the bright-line bar
would approve of the effect which is achieved by the First Circuit's
decision. These advocates would let plaintiffs have their day in court-the
opportunity to bear the burdens of proving foreseeability and proximate
cause for negligence claims, or particular damages for public nuisance
claims-in order to pursue the merits of their cases. Under this approach,

73. See Louisiana er rel. Guste v. M/V Testbank, 752 F.2d at 1029, where the court
stated:
The bright line rule of damage to a proprietary interest, as most, has the
virtue of predictability with the vice of creating results in cases at its edge that
are said to be "unjust" or "unfair." Plaintiffs point to seemingly perverse
results, where claims the rule allows and those it disallows are juxtaposedsuch as vessels striking a dock, causing minor but recoverable damage, then
lurching athwart a channel causing great but unrecoverable economic loss. The
answer is that when lines are drawn sufficiently sharp in their definitional edges
to be reasonable and predictable, such differing results are the inevitable
result-indeed, decisions are the desired product. But there is more. The line
drawing sought by plaintiffs is no less arbitrary because the line drawing
appears only in the outcome-as one claimant is found too remote and another
is allowed to recover. The true difference is that plaintiffs' approach would
mask the results. The present rule would be more candid, and in addition, by
making results more predictable, serves a normative function. It operates as
a rule of law and allows a court to adjudicate rather than manage.
74. Barring recovery by remote victims ensures that tort-feasors are not forced to pay
multiple times for the same damage as its impact passes through many transactions in the
economy.
One meaningful distinction to be made among the various categories of
plaintiffs here arises from a desire to avoid double-counting in calculating
damages. Any seafood harvested by the commercial fishermen here would be
bought and sold several times before finally being bought and sold for
consumption. Considerations both of equity and social utility suggest that just
as defendant should not be able to escape liability for destruction of publicly
owned marine life entirely, it should not be caused to pay repeatedly for the
same damage.
Pruitt v. Allied Chem. Corp., 523 F. Supp. 975, 979 (E.D. Va. 1981) (footnotes omitted).
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society in general and the environment would benefit from the higher
standards of performance practiced by the oil shipping industry due to

greater accountability for damages caused by oil spills.75
The Ballard Shipping decision will likely be unpopular with opponents of concurrent state jurisdiction over oil pollution liability. Such
opponents would bemoan the loss of the partial immunity formerly

provided by Robins Dry Dock in oil spill cases when state law was
preempted by admiralty jurisdiction. Being subject to state laws greatly
increases the liability exposure of shipping companies,76 potentially
subjecting them to a multiplicity of liability regimes from state to state.
One analyst worries that:
[I]n those states recognizing actions for non-Robins damages, a
significant number of new claimants will have a cause of action.
An "oil spill foreseeably harms not only ships, docks, piers,
beaches, wildlife, and the like, that are covered with oil, but also

harms blockaded ships, marina merchants, suppliers of those
firms, the employees of marina businesses and suppliers, the

suppliers' suppliers, and so forth." Second, in such states,
"liability for pure financial harm [can be] vast, cumulative and
inherently unknowable in amount." One result of the economic

75. Senate Majority Leader Mitchell noted in 1991 that OPA has this same important
effect:
While most proponents of the [international] Protocols argue that liability
laws have little to do with ensuring accountability for oil spills and deterring
behavior that makes such spills more likely, a key objective of any oil pollution
regime should be to prevent spills by inducing a high standard of care in the
handling and transporting of oil. Legislation by the Congress and the states
clearly reflect the view that an effective method of encouraging a high standard
of care is to ensure that all those responsible for oil spills are held liable for
their actions.
The liability provisions of the OPA are intended to prevent spills by
imposing unlimited liability in cases in which spills are caused not only by
gross negligence or willful misconduct but also by a violation of an applicable
federal operation, safety, or construction regulation. Similarly, state officials
have maintained in testimony before the Senate Subcommittee on Environmental Protection that their strict and unlimited liability laws are designed to
encourage responsible behavior by those persons engaged in handling and
transporting oil and to ensure that the polluter pays for the cleanup costs and
damages that result from spills, to the extent of the polluter's resources.
Mitchell, supra note 29, at 241-42 (footnote omitted).
76. See Louisiana ex rel. Guste v. M/V Testbank, 752 F.2d at 1029.
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disincentive created by this unpredictability could be "insurance
premiums too expensive for the average [shipper]."'
Responding to such arguments in 1991, Senate Majority Leader Mitchell
commented:
It is true that the bankruptcy laws of the United States may
ultimately impose limits on the amount that can be recovered
from a polluter or any other person in our society. That fact,
however, does not diminish the value of federal and state laws
that hold polluters liable for the costs and damages incurred from
some or all of their actions. These laws serve to prevent oil
transporters from making business judgments that insurance is
sufficient to cover the potential costs of any spill. Thus, oil
transporters factor into their business decisions regarding handling and transportation of oil the steps necessary for providing
a high standard of care. These laws also minimize the extent to
which federal and state revenues are used to pay cleanup costs
and damages that are incurred as a result of the actions of shipowners or other persons responsible for handling and transporting
oil. 78
The First Circuit was correct in concluding that Congress is in a
superior position to evaluate the merits of these opposing viewpoints and
to decide whether such burdens interfere with the "proper harmony and
uniformity" of the maritime law to a degree that is excessive.79 This is a

fundamentally legislative decision, and although the maritime law is
generally a body of judge-made law, the courts need to listen when
Congress has spoken on the subject.

77. Eubank, supra note 29, at 157-58 (quoting Barbour Lines A/S v. M/V Donau

Maru, 764 F.2d 50, 54-55 (1st Cir. 1985)).
78. Mitchell, supra note 29, at 243.
79. Ballard Shipping Co. v. Beach Shellfish, 32 F.3d 623, 631 (1st Cir. 1994).
[We think that the [OPAl statute is compelling evidence that Congress does

not view either expansion of liability to cover purely economic losses or
enactment of comparable state oil pollution regimes as an excessive burden on

maritime commerce. Given the Congress' superior ability to weigh the very
practical considerations relating to such a judgment, we give Congress'

conclusion substantial weight. For this purpose, the non-retroactivity of the
statute is irrelevant.
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One federal court outside the First Circuit has already followed the
American Dredging-Jensen preemption analysis as applied in Ballard
Shipping and concluded that Robins Dry Dock did not trigger the preemption of state common law.0 The decision in BallardShipping is particularly important because at least thirteen coastal states currently have oil
pollution liability statutes that explicitly permit injured parties to sue for
purely economic marine damages. 81 If additional circuits follow the First
Circuit's decision, Ballard Shipping-together with OPA for spills on or
after August 18, 1990-will effectively allow an increasing number of
plaintiffs to seek remedies under state law for purely economic damages
resulting from marine oil spills.
V. CONCLUSION

The decision of the First Circuit in Ballard Shipping Co. v. Beach
Shellfish is an important, early application of the Supreme Court's 1994
American Dredging refinement of the Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen
preemption test. The First Circuit's nonpreemption decision is consistent
with Congress' intent to allow concurrent state jurisdiction over the
recovery of purely economic losses arising from maritime oil spills. As
a result of the Ballard Shipping decision, plaintiffs who have been
financially harmed, by a forced cessation of their livelihoods due to an oil
spill before OPA's effective date, are able to seek compensation under
state law. This is an important step forward in protecting oil spill victims,
the environment and states' rights to legislate remedies. Furthermore, the
court's holding that the Robins Dry Dock rule is not a "characteristic
feature" of the general maritime law, and therefore does not trigger
preemption under the second prong of the American Dredging-Jensentest,
is likely to have broad ramifications for recovery under state law for many

80. See In re Nautilus Motor Tanker Co., Ltd., 900 F. Supp. 697 (D.N.J. 1995).
The plaintiff in this case sought recovery for purely economic damages resulting from a
June 1990, pre-OPA marine oil spill. The United States District Court for the District of
New Jersey followed the First Circuit's Ballard Shipping application of the American
Dredging rule. The district court held that New Jersey common law of negligence was not
preempted by Robins Dry Dock. In this case, unlike BallardShipping, there was no state
statutory private right of action for purely economic damages. Id. at 702-05.
81. Eubank, supra note 29, at 158-65. States with statutory liability laws include:
North Carolina, Texas, Virginia, New York, Louisiana, Maryland, California,
Connecticut, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Oregon, Washington, and Florida. Id. See
also Survey of State Legislation, 5 U.S.F. MAR. L. J. 447, 452-512 (1993).
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kinds of purely economic maritime tort losses that have been barred in the
past.

